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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
time, the presence or absence of a financial limitation on an action has
been the most significant consideration. Indeed, all of the cases that have
arisen striking down lex loci delicti have been at issue over some restric-
tion, be it a limit on recovery or a rule disallowing the action. Yet, one
would expect these issues to overturn lex loci delicti since they point out
the unreasonableness of the old inflexible rule. This new approach will
soon be argued in areas which will not concern financial limitations.
While the new rule is developing, perhaps it might be best to begin an
attack on these problems by applying the lex loci delicti rule as a rebuttable
presumption, putting the burden on the party attempting to have the court
apply the law of another jurisdiction to show what interests the other
jurisdiction possessed to rebut the presumption. The presumption could be
rebutted by showing that fex loci was the only interest that that state had
or that another state had more "significant contacts." It could also be
rebutted by showing that some undue hardship would be worked on the
plaintiff.
Our purpose here is not to solve the problem that will inevitably arise
or to suggest a new approach, but to present a practical approach, ac-
knowledging the presence of difficulties in this changing area. These
problems are no different than the many problems which face the bar with
every judicial reform. The only solution to the "uncertainty" that these
problems present is the development of a body of judicial determination
to establish the limits of the rule. The certainty will develop through the
establishment of precedents as has been done in many other new areas of
the law. One thing is certain at the present time; all of the critics of the
lex loci rule and many of the critics of the new rule realize that some
flexibility is needed in this area. The "interest analysis" approach, if any-
thing, adds this. It is now in the hands of the practitioners and the courts
to further develop it along proper lines and establish the certainty so
frantically sought.
Jack J. Bernstein
William B. Freilich
MARRIAGE BY INJUNCTION:
A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS ENJOINING DIVORCE
A state may restrain persons over whom it has in personam jurisdic-
tion from instituting proceedings in foreign jurisdictions., Further, each
state regulates and controls the marital status of its domiciliaries. The
purpose of this comment is to focus attention upon the conditions under
1. 17 AM. JUR., Divorce and Separation § 997 (1957) ; 28 AM. JUR., Injunctions
§ 200 (1959).
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which the courts will exercise their equity jurisdiction to restrain a spouse
from prosecuting a divorce action in a foreign country or sister state. This
comment will examine specifically this remedy as developed in Pennsylvania.
I.
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
Injunctions by the Chancellor against suits in other courts date back
to at least the late sixteenth century.2 The very existence of the power,
however, was denied in the seventeenth century3 and thereby the operation
and development of this remedy was delayed. The reason for the negative
determination was the misapprehension as to the operation of the decree.
It was decided that an injunction would not be issued to restrain a suit
in any "foreign ports" since this would be an unauthorized interference
with the conduct of the foreign court and would be an attempt to prohibit it
from assuming jurisdiction. This misconception was subsequently rectified
in the case of Lord Portarlington v. Soulby.4 The Chancellor in that case
granted an injunction restraining a party from bringing a suit in another
court. He reasoned that his court did not direct or control the foreign
court, but did direct the party within the jurisdiction of the injunction
forum. This approach has been uniformly adopted in England5 and in
the United States.
The leading American case accepting this principle is Cole v. Cun-
ningham.6 In that case, a citizen of Massachusetts was indebted to a
copartnership doing business in Massachusetts. A consignor in New York
was indebted to the Massachusetts resident. The copartnership assigned its
claim to a New York party who proceeded to summon the consignor as
garnishee in a litigation in New York against the Massachusetts citizen.
Subsequently, assignees in insolvency for the estate of the Massachusetts
resident were duly appointed. These assignees in insolvency brought a bill
in equity in Massachusetts requesting that the members of the copartner-
ship and their assignee be enjoined from continuing the suit against the
Massachusetts citizen in the New York courts. Their contention was that
the New York suit would cause injury to other residents of Massachusetts,
namely, to other creditors of the Massachusetts party. The Massachusetts
court, agreeing with this contention, held that the copartnership, its mem-
bers being within the court's jurisdiction, should be enjoined from prosecut-
ing the New York suit.7 The members of the copartnership appealed from
this decision to the Supreme Court of the United States, but the decision
was affirmed.
2. Cliffe v. Turnor, Cary 83 (1579) ; Chock v. Cheu, Cary 83 (1579) ; Tanfield
v. Davenport, Tot. 114 (1638) ; Trinick v. Bordfield, Tot. 117 (1638).
3. Lowe v. Baker, 2 Freem. Ch. 125; 22 Eng. Rep. 1101 (1665).
4. 3 My. & K. 104, 40 Eng. Rep. 40 (1834).
5. Venning v. Loyd, 1 De G. F. & J. 193, 45 Eng. Rep. 332 (1859).
6. 133 U.S. 107 (1890).
7. 142 Mass. 47, 6 N.E. 782 (1886).
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The Supreme Court's reasoning and decision followed that of the
Chancellor in Lord Portarlington v. Soulby.8 The Court held that the
equity court in directing its injunction was controlling domiciliaries in
their actions, not usurping the jurisdiction of the foreign state court. There-
fore the Court determined that a decree of a state court enjoining citizens
of that state from prosecuting attachment suits begun in another state, and
brought therein in order to evade the laws of the first state was a valid
exercise of the first court's equity power and was not violative of the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States., Thus,
injunctions to prevent proceedings in other courts received its impetus in
the United States.
Courts are necessarily reluctant to exercise such power and when
called upon to do so will carefully weigh the equities. An analysis of the
reported cases where an injunction has been issued shows that the issuance
has always been based upon one of five grounds.' 0 The rule is generally
applied: to prevent great hardship and expense in defending suits," to
prohibit evasion of the laws of the forum,12 to curtail fraud, 18 to prevent
vexatious litigation,' 4 and to avoid a multiplicity of suits.'"
II.
INJUNCTION AGAINST DIVORCE
In 1850, a New York court enjoined a resident spouse, attempting
to circumvent the laws of New York, from prosecuting a divorce action
in a sister state.'0 That case involved a spouse attempting to procure a
Pennsylvania divorce although he did not have a bona fide Pennsylvania
residence. The court reasoned that, even though New York would not
recognize the divorce, it would be inequitable to put the wife, who was
also a New York domiciliary, under the cloud of such a decree, or put
her to the expense of the litigation necessary to avoid it.
Once this precedent was established, the power to enjoin a resident
spouse was exercised liberally until the case of Goldstein v. Goldstein.17
There, the defendant-husband had attempted to acquire a Florida divorce.
8. 3 My. & K. 104, 40 Eng. Rep. 40 (1834).
9. Art. IV § 1.
10. See Comment, 13 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 148 (1947).
11. Kern v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446 (1933);
Ippolito v. Ippolito, 3 N.J. 561, 71 A.2d 196 (1950) (dictum).
12. Oates v. Morningside College, 217. Iowa 1059, 252 N.W. 783 (1934) ; Ballard
v. Ballard, 199 Miss. 316, 24 So. 2d 335 (1946).
13. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 239 Ala. 141, 194 So. 493 (1940) ; Kahn v. Kahn, 325 Ill.
App. 137, 59 N.E.2d 874 (1945) ; Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951).
14. Commercial Acetylene Co. v. Avery Portable Lighting Co., 152 Fed. 642
(7th Cir. 1906).
15. Newell v. Newell, 289 P.2d 22 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). For a complete
breakdown of all the cases on this topic concerning divorce, see 54 A.L.R.2d 1240.
16. Forrest v. Forrest, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 180 (N.Y. 1850).
17. 283 N.Y. 146, 27 N.E.2d 969 (1940).
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Under the alleged facts, neither party was a domiciliary of that state. The
plaintiff requested an injunction in New York to restrain defendant from
taking or procuring a judgment of divorce in Dade County, Florida, but
the injunction was denied. The court decided that on these facts the
Florida court was without jurisdiction since Florida was not the matri-
monial domicile. Pursuant to the decision of Haddock v. Haddock,", the
divorce does not have to be recognized since New York could refuse to
recognize an ex parte divorce in a state other than the state of matrimonial
domicile. Therefore the instant plaintiff had nothing to fear from the
Florida action since it could be declared a nullity. The court rejected
plaintiff's contentions of her annoyance and injured feelings.
In 1942, the Haddock case was overruled by the first of the Williams
v. North Carolina9 cases. That case held that a divorce must be granted
recognition by all states if either spouse was a domiciliary of the granting
state. This holding was limited by the second Williams case2 ° which stated
that the finding of domicile by the granting state would not be conclusive
but merely raises a presumption of validity which the assailant must rebut.
Now the party seeking an injunction would have something to fear - he
must overturn the presumption of validity of the foreign divorce decree.
In 1951, the Goldstein case in turn was overturned by the decision
of Garvin v. Garvin.21 The New York Court of Appeals determined that
an injunction restraining a sister state divorce proceeding may be issued.
The court held that since any divorce that the husband might obtain would
presumptively be accorded full faith and credit, the wife should be saved
the burden of striking down the prima facie effect of the decree. Cognizant
of the aforementioned burden, the Garvin decision was a natural outgrowth
of the second Williams case. Today there are decisions in eight states 22
that have upheld an injunction against a divorce proceeding in a sister state.
In the case of Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum,23 involving a foreign country
divorce, the New York Court of Appeals refused to grant an injunction.
Rosenbaum involved an action by a wife to enjoin her husband from
prosecuting a divorce action in Mexico. The court failed to grant the
injunction by distinguishing foreign country divorces from sister state
proceedings. The court decided that since there was no presumptive
legality to be accorded Mexican divorces, because they were beyond the
scope of full faith and credit, no injunction need be granted. The court
18. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
19. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
20. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). Williams II does not completely resolve the problem.
At present, there may be different concepts of domicil among the states. Therefore, a
valid adjudication of domicil by one state using its own standards may be set aside in
a subsequent action in another state whose standards of domicil are more stringent.
21. 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951).
22. Alabama, California, Illinois, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
Rhode Island. Mississippi, in Ballard v. Ballard, 199 Miss. 316, 24 So. 2d 335 (1946),
indicated that they would recognize the remedy in a proper case. See 54 A.L.R.2d
1240, for an annotation of the cases in this area.
23. 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
COMMENTS
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1964], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss1/6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
stated, ". . . Thus, under comity - as contrasted with full faith and
credit - our courts have power to deny even prima facie validity to the
judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons, despite whatever allega-
tions of jurisdiction may appear on the face of such foreign judgments. '2 4
In other words, since the foreign divorce would not be recognized, no
burden was placed upon the wife and an injunction was unnecessary.
Identical reasonings was proffered in the Goldstein case. This logic,
mechanically valid as it may be, ignores the annoyances which would be
caused by a legally invalid Mexican decree. Although the spouse may have
the divorce declared void, meanwhile she may be subjected to the jeopardy
of a questionable marriage status.
Other jurisdictions, faced with the identical problem, have issued
injunctions. In New Jersey, the Court of Chancery25 held that a spouse
may be enjoined from prosecuting a suit for divorce in a foreign jurisdic-
tion. The New Jersey court apparently saw no difference between an in-
junction against a sister state proceeding and an injunction against a
foreign country divorce since the language of the case drew no distinction
and the holding was entirely based on Kempson v. Kempson,26 a sister
state injunction case.
Even though the next section of this comment deals solely with
Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania case of Young v. Young27 must be
noted at this point. The court motivated by the hardship factor, granted
an injunction against a Mexican divorce. This court felt that subjecting
the wife to the jeopardy of a questionable marital status and to vexatious
litigation was sufficient to grant the relief sought. The court stated its
view thusly:
Should he succeed in securing a judgment in his favor in Mexico,
he would acquire an unfair and unconscionable advantage over her.
She is a citizen of this Commonwealth clothed with the status of a
lawful wife, and, in the full and unquestioned enjoyment of that status
and of the right incident to it, she is entitled to protection of our laws
and of our courts. We will not permit her to be forced into a foreign
land to defend rights which our law secures to her as a citizen. The
law of her home is adequate to protect her in such a situation.28
This decision rested heavily upon Greenberg v. Greenberg,20 a New York
case subsequently repudiated by the Goldstein8 0 and Rosenbaum8 1 reasoning.
There is no reason, however, to believe that this is not still the law in
Pennsylvania, as Young, also rested heavily on the hardship to the innocent
spouse, a factor discounted by the New York judiciary.
24. Id. at 372, 130 N.E.2d at 903.
25. Knapp v. Knapp, 12 N.J. Misc. 599, 173 At. 343 (1934).
26. 58 N.J. Eq. 94, 43 Atl. 97 (1899), aff'd, 63 N.J. Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 360 (1902).
27. 16 Pa. D. & C. 287 (1932).
28. Id. at 289.
29. 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N.Y. Supp. 87 (1st Dep't 1926).
30. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N.Y. 146, 27 N.E.2d 969 (1940).
31. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 285 App. Div. 427, 138 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1955).
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III.
INJUNCTION AGAINST DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
It might be well, at the outset, to state the general rule of the
Commonwealth as to when a court has the right to restrain a person
over whom the court has jurisdiction. It has generally been held in
Pennsylvania that there is no question as to the right to restrain a person
over whom the court has jurisdiction from bringing a suit in a foreign
state.32 An action in another state may be enjoined because it: (1) inter-
feres inequitably with local litigation, (2) inequitably evades local litiga-
tion or (3) otherwise requires the interposition of equity to prevent
manifest wrong or injustice.33
The first case in Pennsylvania which involved the restraining of an
action for divorce was Young v. Young. 34 The Common Pleas Court of
Philadelphia exercised its equitable power to issue an injunction against
the divorce litigation in a foreign country notwithstanding the absence
of reported precedents in the state. The court found that the facts fully
justified their action since the husband realized that he was not entitled
to a divorce in Pennsylvania and travelled to Mexico to secure a sham
divorce decree. The court based its injunction on four factors: (1) the
defendant's attempt to evade the laws of Pennsylvania; (2) the hardship
to the plaintiff in defending against the defendant's suit in a foreign
country; (3) the jeopardy of a questionable marital status; and (4) the
prevention of the defendant from gaining an unfair advantage over the
wife if he were to succeed in the Mexican action.
This precedent was followed in the case of Meng v. Meng,3 5 where
the husband had started a divorce action in Pennsylvania. This was dis-
continued and the husband subsequently went to Reno, Nevada, to obtain
a divorce decree. His wife then brought a bill in equity to prevent the
Nevada divorce. The court, in granting the injunction, was leery of the
hardship of a sister state divorce decree. This is exemplified by Judge
P. J. Gordon when he stated, "The effects of a final decree in divorce on
the rights of a wife are radical and far reaching; it deprives her of her
right of support,3 6 extinguishes her dower rights, forces upon her a
complete change in her social status, and profoundly alters the whole
environment of her life."'3 7 The logic of this statement is unassailable.
A party should not be permitted to consummate a scheme of evasion of the
laws of the Commonwealth and place the aggrieved spouse in a situation
where she must defend herself against a judgment fraudulently obtained.
32. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Ashelman, 300 Pa. 291, 150 Atd. 475 (1930).
33. Id. at 295-96, 150 Ati. at 476.
34. 16 Pa. D & C. 287 (1932).
35. 47 Pa. D. & C. 429 (1943).
36. Commonwealth ex rel. Kurniker v. Kurniker, 96 Pa. Super. 553 (1929).
37. 47 Pa. D. & C. 429, 436 (1943).
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The reasoning of Meng was accepted by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Janney v. Janney,38 and has subsequently been embedded
in the substantive law of Pennsylvania. 39 Thus, the law of Pennsylvania
from the time that the question was initially raised and decided has never
permitted the entertainment of any doubt as to the protection which the
marital status of a Pennsylvania domiciliary is entitled. The courts will
exercise its jurisdiction so as to curtail the injustices afforded a party
who makes a responsible appeal to the conscience and discretion of the court.
Although the existence of injunctive relief is a certainty, the metes
and bounds concerning the application of this remedy are not so well
settled in the Commonwealth. One of the major problems concerns the
time for the bringing of the injunction.
The case of Smith v. Smith40 exemplifies the situation where an
injunction will not be issued because of plaintiff's delay in bringing the
action. In Smith, the plaintiff-wife brought a suit to enjoin the defendant-
husband from prosecuting divorce proceedings in the State of Florida.
The husband had not received the sister state decree at the time of the
Pennsylvania proceeding. The Supreme Court held that the evidence
established that defendant was no longer domiciled within Pennsylvania
and therefore the Courts of Pennsylvania had no power to restrain him.
The court analyzed that ". . . a divorce granted by a court of the bona fide
domicile of either spouse is valid and must be given full faith and credit.
The only ground upon which a divorce decree of another jurisdiction
may be attacked is that it was not the bona fide domicile of either spouse....
Since equity has no power to restrain a person from obtaining a lawful
divorce, it follows that an injunction may only be granted where the spouse
has not established a bona fide domicile in the state in which the divorce
is sought."'41
This analysis has merit for two reasons. First, since a married spouse
may acquire a new domicile for the purpose of divorce,42 the original
marital state loses some of its interest in the marriage. Second, and more
important, if there has been a valid assertion of domicile (the factor on
which the right to maintain a divorce action is predicated) ,4 the act that
the spouse is attempting is perfectly valid. It would be anamolous to
38. 350 Pa. 133, 38 A.2d 235 (1944).
39. The following Pennsylvania cases were concerned with this issue: Wallace v.
Vallace, 371 Pa. 404, 89 A.2d 769 (1952); Smith v. Smith, 364 Pa. 1, 70 A.2d 630(1950) ; Robinson v. Robinson, 362 Pa. 554, 67 A.2d 273 (1949) ; Janney v. Janney,
350 Pa. 133, 38 A.2d 235 (1944) ; Murtagh v. Murtagh, 10 Chester 591 (1962) ; Wenz
v. Wenz, 28 Lehigh L.J. 468 (1960) ; Zuroff v. Zuroff, 58 Pa. D. & C. 325 (1947) ;
Huyett v Huyett, 38 Berks. 175 (1946) ; Mianulli v. Mianulli, 51 Pa. D. & C. 497(1944); Meng v. Meng, 47 Pa. D. & C. 429 (1943); Young v. Young, 16 Pa. D. & C.
287 (1932).
40. 364 Pa. 1, 70 A.2d 630 (1950).
41. Id. at 4, 70 A.2d at 632.
42. Harrison v. Harrison, 107 Pa. Super. 161, 163 Atl. 62 (1932) ; Starr v. Starr,
78 Pa. Super. 579 (1922).
43. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). "Under our system of
law, judicial power to grant a divorce - jurisdiction, strictly speaking - is founded
on domicil."
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place a party in jeopardy for an act which the enjoining state would
subsequently be bound to recognize. It therefore seems a proper decision
not to enjoin a party who has acquired a new bona fide domicile.
Whether an injunction against a divorce action will be awarded
where the spouse has already been awarded the divorce decree has never
been decided by an appellate court in the Commonwealth. Two lower
court opinions 44 presume that an injunction could be granted even after
the divorce action is culminated. These courts felt that an injunction may
still be issued even after the divorce decree, since there was no bona fide
domicile established in the divorce state and therefore the decree is invalid.
This reasoning may be legally valid but its practical effect is ridiculous.
How can injunctive relief be granted against a fact accomplished? The
enjoining state is telling the defendant not to do an act which he has
already done. It may be perfectly logical to nullify the foreign divorce,
but it is absurd to enjoin against it. Two New York cases45 have stated
that injunctive relief should not be granted after a divorce decree has
already been awarded. However, in both these cases the procurer of the
divorce decree was a bona fide domiciliary of the granting state so that
the divorce was valid. It will be interesting to see if any appellate court
will uphold an injunction against a divorce after an invalid decree is
granted. It is submitted that it should not.
Another problem in this area is the situation where an action for
injunction against divorce is premature. This issue has recently been
decided to some extent by the lower court case of Murtagh v. Murtagh.46
In Murtagh, the defendant-husband went to Nevada. It was concluded
that he was still domiciled in Pennsylvania. He threatened to get a divorce
and had attempted some negotiations through his attorneys. He had not
brought a divorce action in Nevada at the time his wife brought the instant
injunctive proceeding. The court held that no injunction could be granted
merely upon proof of a marital disturbance and physical presence of one
spouse in a state that facilitates divorce. There must be at least a showing
that a divorce action has been commenced or that there is an intention
to initiate a divorce action in the immediate future.
There is a split of authority in the-United States on the issue of
whether there must be more than nMere talk or threats of a proposed
divorce action to justify the injunction.47 Those that have refused to
grant the injunctions rest their opinions on the old equity adage that the
preliminary injunction should not be granted unless there is a showing
44. Wallace v. Wallace, 67 Montg. Co. L.R. 232 (1951), rev'd on other grounds,
371 Pa. 404, 89 A.2d 769 (1952) ; Meng v. Meng, 47 Pa. D. & C. 429 (1943).
45. Sivakoff v. Sivakoff, 280 App. Div. 106, 111 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1952) ; Philipson
v. Philipson, 191 Misc. 913, 80 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1948).
46. 10 Chester 591 (1962).
47. DeRaay v. DeRaay, 255 App. Div. 544, 8 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1938), aff'd without
opinion, 280 N.Y. 822, 21 N.E.2d 879 (1938), holding that mere threat to bring a
divorce action is not enough to warrant injunctive relief. For a contrary view see,
Kahn v. Kahn, 325 Ill. App. 137, 59 N.E.2d 874 (1945).
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of imminent danger of irreparable harm.48 This is well reasoned since a
court should not interfere with the liberty of a citizen to compel him to
maintain a particular domicile.49 If the divorce seeker establishes a bona
fide domicile during the period between the threat and the commencement
of the suit, the injunction would be nugatory since the spouse would be
lawfully obtaining the divorce. Since domicile is so dependent upon intent,
and intent may easily fluctuate, it is obvious that the enjoining court should
wait until the commencement of the divorce to determine the domicile,
since that is the time the intent is determinative to the action. Until some
affirmative act towards divorce is taken which would affect the plaintiff's
rights, it is submitted that the time of the injunction relief is premature.
IV.
CONCLUSION
No comment on this topic would be complete without a discussion of
the effect of this remedy. Since the injunction acts upon the party rather
than the court in which the enjoined action is pending, the divorce court
has the power to proceed with the litigation despite the injunction.50 This
is true since it has generally been assumed that such an injunction is not
entitled to full faith and credit under the United States Constitution,
although there has been no Supreme Court decision on this issue.51
Furthermore, if the local state does not recognize the injunction, this will
not have a detrimental effect upon the divorce decree's validity.52 These
principles severely undermine the deterrent factor of the injunction. How-
ever, the divorce court could and should as a matter of comity recognize the
injunction and take cognizance of the judicial policy of the enjoining state.
If this fails, there is still a deterrent to the wrongful spouse. If he returns
to the enjoining state, he would be subject to a contempt proceeding53
and his local property might be sequestered. 54
It is important to note that even if the injunction was erroneously
issued any defendant violating that order would still be in contempt and
subject to prosecution so long as the enjoining court had jurisdiction.
The injunction would not be void, but only voidable on proper application;
and until it is set aside or revoked, it is entitled to obedience.5 5 This would
48. DeRaay v. DeRaay, 255 App. Div. 544, 8 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1938), aff'd without
opinion, 280 N.Y. 822, 21 N.E.2d 879 (1938).
49. Ballard v. Ballard, 199 Miss. 316, 24 So. 2d 335 (1946). Boston v. Boston,
205 Misc. 561, 129 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1954).
50. Kleinschmidt v. Kleinschmidt, 343 Ill. App. 539, 99 N.E.2d 623 (1951).
51. CHEATHAM, GRISWOLD, REESE & ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
FLICT or LAWS 266 (5th ed. 1964).
52. Hall v. Milligan, 221 Ala. 233, 128 So. 438 (1930) ; Kleinschmidt v. Klein-
schmidt, 343 Ill. App. 539, 99 N.E.2d 623 (1951) ; Com. ex rel. Messing v. Messing,
195 Pa. Super. 334, 171 A.2d 893 (1961).
53. Janney v. Janney, 350 Pa. 133, 38 A.2d 235 (1944).
54. See Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Migra-
tory Divorce, 2 LAW & COMTEMP. PROD. 370, 386-91 (1935), for an analysis of this
problem.
55. 12 AM. JUR., Contempt § 26 (1938).
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